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HALL Vs. WATERHOUSE.
Where property of which a testatrix is seised in fee is devised to a married
woman, her heirs and assigns (without the intervention of a trustee), with a
direction that it shall not be under the control or be liatle to the debts of her
husband:
Held, that she has full power, during coverture, to dispose of it absolutely in
fee simple by will.

This was a bill filed by devisees in trust under the will of Charlotte Roberts, praying for a declaration of the rights and interests of all parties in .the real and personal estate of the said
Charlotte Roberts, and that the trusts of her will and codicil
might be carried into execution and administered unler the
direction of the court.
Charlotte Roberts (formerly Charlotte Waterhouse) was married to her husband*John Roberts (who is still living) on or about
the 20th July 1836. On the 26th May 1857 her only surviving
brother died intestate, whereupon she and her sister Sarah Waterhouse became entitled as co-heiresses at law to an estate in fee
simple in certain lands at Lindley, in the parish of Huddersfield,
subject to an annuity charged on part thereof in favor of Betty
Waterhouse, the widow of their father, John Waterhouse.
The bill stated that by an indenture dated the 16th May 1859,
between Betty Waterhouse (since deceased) and Benjamin Hanson (trustees of thewill of John Waterhouse) of the first part,
John Roberts and Charlotte his. wife of the second part, Sarah
Waterhouuse of the third part, the said John Roberts of the fourth
part, George Crowther of the fifth part, the said Charlotte Roberts
of the sixth part, and Sarah Waterhouse of the seventh part, the
said lands at Lindley were limited (subject as to part to a mortgage, and as to the whole to the said annuity).
- To the use of such person or persons and for such dstate and
estates, use and uses in such parts, shares, and proportions, upon
such trusts, and for such intents and purposes, and subject to such
powers, charges, conditions, limitations, and agreements, and in
such manner and form as Charlotte Roberts, whether covert or
sole, and nothwithstanding her coverture, should from time to
time when and so often as she should think proper, by deed or
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deeds, writing or writings under her hand and seal duly executed
and attested, or by her last will and iestament in writing, or any
writing in the nature of or purporting to be her last will and testament, to be by her duly executed and attested, direct, limit, appoint, charge, convey, demise, give, devise, or dispose of the same
or any part thereof;"
And in default of such appointment to the use of the said
Charlotte Roberts, her heirs and assigns for ever. The other
moiety of thb same hereditaments was limitec to similar uses in
favor of Sarah Waterhouse.
The bill also stated that by another indenture dated the 17th
May 1859, and made between the said Charlotte Roberts of the
one part and the said John Roberts of the other part, Charlotte
Roberts, in consideration that one moiety of the before-mentioned
hereditaments had been by the last-mentioned indenture limited
to. such uses in her favor as above mentioned, appointed to John
Roberts a yearly rent-charge of 151., payable out of aid chargeable upon her undivided moiety of the said hereditaments.
The answer stated that from'a copy of the above settlement
furnished to the defendants it appeared that the indenture of thd
16th May recited that Charlotte Roberts and Sarah Waterhouse
were then seised in fee simple of the entirety of the above-mentioned real estate, subject to the annuity; also that the annuity
to John Roberts was for his life only, and in perpetuity, and that
by the deed, after reciting that John Roberts, in consideration
of the annuity, had agreed to join therein, the said Betty Waterhouse and Benjamin Hanson purported according to their estate
and interese to grant, and the said John Roberts and Charlotte
his wife, and also the said Sarah Waterhouse purported to grant
and confirm, and in consideration of an annuity, &e., the said
John Roberts purported to release 'and confirm to George Crowther and his heirs the said hereditaments, to hold to George Crowther, his heirs and assigns (subject to the mortgage and annuity
first above mentioned) to such uses as were mentioned in the bill.
It appeared that the indenture of the 16th May 1859 was duly
acknowledged by Mrs. Roberts.
The answer also stated that subsequently to the date of the
last-mentioned indenture Charlotte Roberts and'Sarah Waterhouse
purchased in their joint names certain freehold cottages at Lindley, and caused the same to be conveyed to the said George Crowther. Defendants believed no declaration of trust was made
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touching these last-mentioned hereditaments, but George Crow.
ther held the saine upon trust for Charlotte Roberts and Sarah
Waterhouse.
Sarah Waterhouse, by her will dated the 28th September 1860,
devised and bequeathed the whole of her real and personal estate
to her sister, the said Charlotte Roberts, upon trust to collect and
-get in all the debts and money owing to her, and, out of the
moneys arising therefrom, to pay her debts and funeral expenses;
and after payment and satisfaction of the same, gave, devised,
and bequeathed all her before-mentioned moiety in the estate at
Lindley, with all the testatrix's furniture and surplus cash that might be in her sister's possession, and which the testatrix directed
she should retain for her and her heirs, executors, administrators,
and assigns for her and their own benefit for ever; and she further
directed that none of the above-recited real and personal estate
should come under the control or intermeddling, or be liable to
the debts or interferences of her sister's then present or any
future husband. The will also contained the following clause:,,I nominate, constitute, and appoint my sister Charlotte
Roberts sole executrix of this my last will and testament; and I
do direct that it shall and may be lawful for her to deduct and
retain out of my said estate and effects all such, sum and sums
of money which she shall pay, bear, expend, or be put unto, for
or by reason of her acting in the execution of the trusts of thio
my will."
Sarah Waterhouse died on the 28th September 1860.
The answer stated, that after Sarah Waterhouse's death Charlotte Roberts purchased her (i. e. Sarah's) several freehold cottages
at Lindley, and the defendants had been informed and believed
that the same had been conveyed to George Crowther and his
heirs, without, as they believed, any declaration of trust; but
that George Crowther stood seised of the same at Charlotte
Roberts's death, in trust for her, and as Part of her estate. The
answer stated that the plaintiffs alleged that by an indenture
dated the 23d February 1864, George Crowther had conveyes4
these last-mentioned hereditaments to the use of the plaintiffs1
their heirs and uSsigns.
Charlotte Uoberts, by her will, dated the 11th January 1864,
by virtue and in exercise of the power of appointment given to
her by the indenture of the 16th May 1859, purported to appoint
as follows :-
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I hereby appoint and devise a moiety of all and every the
hereditaments comprised in the said indenture (except certain
portions which had been sold), and I hereby also devise the other
moiety of the same hereditaments (except as aforesaid) which was
devised to me by my late sister Sarah Watherhouse for my separate use, and in exercise of all other powers of disposition vested
in me, I appoint, devise, and bequeath all other the real and personal estate which I am or shall at my death be able to devise
and bequeath, unto Charles Hall, Henry Hall Iredale, and David
Binns (the present plaintiffs), to hold the said hereditaments with
the appurtenances and all other my real and personal estate whatsoever and wheresoever unto said C. Hall, H. H. Iredale, and D.
Binns, their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, according to the nature and quality thereof respectively (subject, as to
the first moiety, to the annuity charged thereon in favor of testatrix's husband John Roberts), upon trust as soon as conveniently might be after my decease, or when and at such time or
times, or in such manner as they may think proper, to sell and
dispose of the same hereditaments and premises, and all other my
real and personal estate and effects, either together or in parcels," &c.
Charlotte Roberts died on the 5th April 1864 without issue,
leaving her husband surviving. The defendants Elizabeth Waterhouse and Ann Hirst, as surviving children of Thomas, son of
Joseph, son of John Waterhouse, the father of Sarah Waterhouse
and Charlotte Roberts, claimed to be the co-heiresses at law of
Charlotte Roberts.
John Roberts, the testatrix's husband, was originally made a
defendant, but was afterwards struck out, having disclaimed all
interest in the real and personal estate of his late wife.
The plaintiffs' contention was that the devise in Sarah Waterhouse's will gave to Charlotte Roberts an absolute power of testamentary appointment over Sarah's moiety.
The defendants submitted that Sarah's will, as such, created a
trust for the separate use of Charlotte Roberts, for her life only;
and that Charlotte's will was inoperative, so far as it purported
to be an appointment of Sarah's moiety.
falin8, Q. C. and T. C Wright, for the plaintiffs.-The question as to whether a married woman can make a disposition by
will of property which had previously been devised to her sepa-
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rate use was decided in the case of Bippon vs. Dawding, Ambl.
565, and had recently (since the filing of the present bill) been
again decided by the L. 0. in the ease of Taylor vs. Meads,
12 Law Times, N. S. 6. In the present instance the plaintiffs,
under the will of Mrs. Roberts, were entitled to the equitable
estate in fee simple of that property, devised to the testatrix by
her sister Sarah Waterhouse. They therefore asked that there
might be a declaration to that effect, and that the defendants,
the co-heiresses at law, might be compelled to convey the legal
estate to them.
Bacon, Q. C. and Lococke Webb, for the defendants.-The will
of Sarah Waterhouse only gave the testatrix a life-estate in the
property, and at her death the defendants, the co-heiresses at
law, according to the doctrine of the common law, became entitled. The right as to three separate properties had to be taken
into consideration. First, as the moiety of the estates which
was settled'-n the testatrix by the indenture of 1859 ; secondly,
as to that purchased jointly by the two sisters in the lifetime of
Sarah Waterhouse, ana which had not been devised; and thirdly,
as to the property purchased by the testatrix subsequently to the
death of her sister. As to the settlement of 1859, although that
deed was duly acknowledged, the property comprised under it
wvas property to which the testatrix, previously to her marriage,
had no title. The question, therefore, would arise whether it
was possible for a married woman td settle property which has
desbended to her during coverture, so as to enable her afterwards
to devise it in fee. It was only subsequently to her marriage,
by the deed of 1859, that the property was settled to her separate use. By the statutes of 35 Hen. 8 and 1 Vict., a married
woman is incapacitated from making a will. This court, it was
contended, will not lend its assistance to the indirect performance
of that which the law directly prohibits. As to the second point,
the testatrix had not the power to purchase property conjointly
with her sister and convey it to trustees. As to the third point,
it was not permissible for a feme covert out of her own savings to
purchase property and settle it to her own separate use: Peacock vs. Monk, 2 Ves., senior, 191; Churchill vs. Dibben, 9 Sim.
447, n. (and see cases there cited). In the case of Taylor vs.
Meads, relied on by the plaintiffs, the legal estate was vested,
not in the married woman herself, but in a trustee for her separate use.
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The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-I have no doubt that, according to

the law of this court, a married woman, entitled to freehold estate
in fee simple absolutely to her sole and separate use, may dispose
of it by a will made during her coverture; and that the consent
of her husband is a matter of indifference. This proposition has
been, I understand, established by a recent decision of the L. C.,
which has been referred to in the case of Taylor vs. Mleads. But
there are cases of much older date than, that, in which difficulties
have arisen upon questions relating to wills made by married
women, entitled to personal estate to their separate use, without
the consent of their husbands. The text-writers, justified by
authority, have laid down the proposition that the only effect
of the consent of the husband to the will of his wife is, the
waiver of his interest in her personal estate as administrator.
That is the only object which, they state, is attained. But where
a freehold estate belongs to the wife absolutely in fee simple,
being settled to her separate use, a will made by. her will be
valid either as the execution of a power, or, in case of there
being no power, then as a disposition of the property belonging
to her to her separate use during her coverture. The case of
Dingwell vs. Askew, 1 Cox 427, is an authority on that point.
It is quite plain that there is a principle which governs the question, for if the legal right of a woman" to separate estate, given
to her absolutely, be not accompanied with a power of alienation
by all the means recognised by the law, it would be an imperfect
right. Where nothing intervenes, there exists a positive arid
valid right in a married woman to alienate her separate estate.
In the present case the right of the plaintiffs is clearly established. As to the other question, an attentive consideration of
the answer will show that it is one which cannot properly be
raised in this suit. The object of the suit is to acquire for the
benefit of the devisees of the wife all that freehold property
which belonged to the wife absolutely and in fee simple. The
defendants, by their answer, endeavor to establish the proposition that the right to certain real estate purchased by the Iiartied woman and paid for out of her own moneys, accrued to the
heir of the married woman, notwithstanding thit it was otherwise
disposed of by her will. It seems to me impossible to follow the
contention thus raised. There seems to me no doubt that the
property was the separate estate of the wife. I therefore consider that all the property mentioned in her will passed to the.
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trustees as directed. There must be a declaration to that effect
and a common administration decree, and an order that the coheiresses at law must convey the legal estate. The costs of the
defendants must be taxed and paid as between solicitor and
client.
The following passages ocqur in Lord
St. Leonard's book upon Powers (8th
ed. 173, 174), with respect to the powers of disposition of married women
over property given to them for their
separate use:-" A gift simply to the
separate use of a married woman is
tantamount to a gift to such uses as
she shall appoint by deed or will," and
"where a married woman has property
settled to her separate use, without any
restraint upon alienation, she is deemed
a feime sole, and may dispose of it accordingly." Doubts have been frequently expressed whether the author
intended to comprise in these sweeping
sentences the interests of married
women in real as well as personal
estate. It has been said that inasmuch
as the decided cases cited in quppbrt
of these propositions relate to the dispbsition of personal property, or, at
any rate, only to the interest of married women in the income of real estate,
the doctrines enunciated must be limited accordingly, and that the writer
did not intend to commit himself to the
position that the powers of disposition
over separate property, accorded" to
married women by -the decisions of
courts of equity in regard to personal
estate, are equally applicable to land.
We think it quite possible that the
cautious spirit which marks the writings and speeches of the author may
have induced him to leave in doubt his
opinion upon a point which had been
much canvassed although never expressly decided. His accustomed zeal
for a moot question has certainly not
been manifested in this instance. We
think he would have clearly expressed

his view on the subject if he had intended to do so. At the same time we
do not suppose he would now find fault
with those who attribute the fullest
significance to the language which he
has used.
By his decision in the principal case
Vice-Chancellor STUART has completed

judicially, so to speak, the fabric of
the separate estate of married women.
It is no credit to the Court of Chancery
that it has taken more than a century
to accomplish a result which, when
stated, is so simple and logical as almost to amount to a truism, viz., that
when property, real or personal, is
given to a married woman for her
separate use, without any express restraint upon alienation, she is to be
treated, as regards such property, as a
feme sole, and may dispose of it by any
of the modes of disposition, inter vivos
or testamentary, by which the law allows an unmarried woman to deal with
her property. In Hearle vs. Greenbank, 1 Ves. Sen. 299 (1749), Lord
HARDwICKE treated it as the settled

rule of the Court, that a married woman
might dispose of personal estate settled
to her separate use. The property in
question in that case had come to the
married woman from her father, and
in Fetteplace vs. Gorges, 1 Ves. Jun.
46 (1789), a distinction was attempted
between separate personal property
which came to the wife from a stranger,
and from her husband, but Lord THunLow refused to accept the distinction,
and since the last mentioned case it has
been firmly established that when personal property is given, or agreed to
be given, to the separate use of a mar-
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ned woman, whether for her life or
absolutely, she may dispose of it as a
fere sole to the full extent of her interest, although no particular power for
that purpose accompanies the gift.
But although Lord HAnnwxcER's rule
raid down in Peacock vs. Monk, 2 Ves.
190) that a feme covert, acting with
respect to her separate property, is
competent to act in all respects as if
she were a feme sole, was expressly
recognised by Lord T-URLOW (Hulme
vs. Tenant, 1 Bro. C. C. 16 (1778)) as
the proper gdide by which to decide
cases on this subject, it has been reserved to the judges of the present day
to emancipate married women in respect of their absolute interests in real
estate.
It is true that in Hulme vs. Tenant,
ubi sup., the power of a feme covert to
dispose of the rents and profits of real
estate given to her for her separate
use, in the same manner as she might
do of personal estate similarly given,
was recognised, and that this doctrine
was extended in Major vs. Lansley, 2
R. & M. 355, to the case of an annuity
issuing out of land; but till recent
years text writers and judges concurred
in the opinion that a limitation of real
estate to a wife in fee to her separate
use, without any express power of disposition, would not enable her to dispose of it during the marriage, otherwise than by fine or recovery, or at all
by will, apparently upon the ground
that inismucl as no power had been
given to her by the instrument to make
any disposition of the property, she
could only do so by the mode prescribed
by the general law, and that if this
were omitted her heir would take the
estate.
It had long been admitted that if an
express power of disposition by deed
or will were added in the gift of real
estate to the separate use of a married
woman, she might exercise the power

and appoint the fee, and that her appointment would be binding in equity
on the conscience of the heir (in whom
the legal estate in fee would remain),
and that a court of equity would treat
the heir, who at law, where the separate estate of married women was not
recognised, would be considered as the
legal owner, as a trustee, and compel
him to make a conveyance to the person in favor of whom the wife had appointed the property (Wright vs. Cadogun, 1 Bro. Parl. C. 486, and Rippon
vs. Dawding, Ambl. 565), but it was
considered that if words expressly authorizing the wife to appoint the fee
were omitted, a power of disposition
could not be implied as incident to the
estate.
The inconsistency of making an interest which owed its whole existence
to the untechnical rules of a court ofequity to depend upon the insertion or
omission of a few words, the intention
being obviously the same in both cases,
found expression in the decision of
Vice-Chancellor Sir JonN LEAcH in
Minot vs. Eaton, 4 L. J.0. S. 184, that
where an estate in fee was given to
trustees for a married woman for her
separate use, she could dispose of her
equitable interest without a fine being
levied; also in the decision of the Court
of Appeal in Ireland (the Lord Chancellor dissenting), in Adams vs- Gamble,
12 Ir. Ch. Rep. 102, that a.similar interest could be disposed of, since the
abolition of fines and recoveries, without the formality of an acknowledged
deed; and in the extra-judicial observations of Lord Justice KNIGHT
BRUCE (when Vice-Chancellor) in .Bag-,
gett vs. Meux, 1 Coll. 138, and of Lord
Justice TURNER, in Atkinson vs. Le
Mann, 23 L. T. 302. But, on the other
hand, the present Master of the Rolls,
in Lechmere vs. Brotheridge, 11 W. R.
814, determined that a married woman
could not dispose, inter vivo8, of an
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equitable fee-simple settled to her separate use, without a deed acknowledged, and Vice-Chancellor KINDERSLETY,in Blackford vs. Wooley, 11 W. R.
478, held that real estate could not be
settled upon a married woman to a
greater extent than for her life. Lord
Chancellor WESTBURY, however, in
Taylor vs. Meads, 13 W. R. 894, decided
that where an estate in fee-simple is
given to trustees for a married woman
for her separate use, she may dispose
of her equitable interest by deed or
will.
After the last-mentioned decision
there only remained one case to be
considered upon the subject, viz., where
trustees are not interposed, but where
the gift is directly to a married woman
of an estate in fee-simple to her separate use, without more. This was the
form of the gift in the principal case,
and Vice-Chancellor STUART has, we
think wisely, followed the Lord Chancellor's recent decision by holding that
the interposition of trustees is immaterial in the eyes of a court of equity,
and that -a will made by a married
woman was effectual to pass a feesimple estate which had been given to
her directly for her separate use. It
follows that, in every case, whether the
gift be directly to a married woman or
to a trustee for her, whether the nature
of the property be real or personal,
whether the extent of the interest given
be for life or absolute, whether a power
of disposition be expressly given or
omitted, a married woman (if she be
not restrained from alienation) has the
same powers of disposition inter vivos,
or by will, over property given to her
for her separate use as if she were a

feme sole.
There only remains one point to be
noticed, which arose on the principal
case. It became a question whether
the implied power of disposition operated so as to carry the power of con-

veying the legal estate in the property,
or whether this was not vested in the
heir of the married woman. The ViceChancellor held that the will only
affected the property in the view of a
court of equity, and that the co-heiresses of the testatrix were trustees for
the persons in whose favor the will had
been made. We feel that this part of
the decision cannot be complained of
so long as the law remains in its present state, according to which a court
of law refuses to pay any regard to the
equitable rights or powers of married
women. It is quite clear that, even-in
cases where an express power of appointment over property is given to a
married woman, she cannot, by her
appointment, affect the legal estate in
the property, but that her power is
confined to pointing out the objects in
whose favor she desires that a court of
equity should interfere. It has accordingly been held on many occasions that,
after such an appointment, the legal
estate remains in the person in whom
it was previously vested, who is held
to be a trustee for the appointees.
Some doubt is thrown upon this point
by Lord ST.LEONARDS, in his comments

upon Harris vs. Mott, 14 Beav. 169.
In this case a wife to whom real estate
had been bequeathed in fee to her separate use, but without an express
power of disposition, joined with her
husband in selling the same to a purchaser, and afterwards died, having
previously made a will in favor of her
husband. The husband filed a bill for
specific performance, but the Master
of the Rolls considered the question
of the wife's power of disposition too
doubtful upon the authorities to justify
the specific performance of the contract. Observing upon this case, Lord
ST. LEoNAnDs says (Powers, 8th ed.
174), "If the wife took by implication
a power to dispose of the estate by
deed or will, the equitable fee passed

